

A BIMODAL PROVABILITY LOGIC – Towards an Interpretability Logic with a Supremum Operator

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Interpretability

$T \triangleright S$: $S \vdash A \Rightarrow T \vdash A^\tau$, for some structure-preserving translation τ

Two perspectives on interpretability:

Notion for comparing theories

Generalisation of provability


Example:
ZFC \triangleright PA

Lattice of Degrees

Degree of T : $\{S \mid S \triangleright T \ \& \ T \triangleright S\}$

Theorem (Švejdar): The degrees of finite extensions of Peano Arithmetic (PA) form a lattice.

$[A]$: the degree of $\text{PA} + A$



Interpretability Logic

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| <i>Modal Language</i> | <i>Meaning in \mathcal{L}_{PA}</i> |
| $\Box A$: | A is provable in PA |
| $A \triangleright B$: | PA + A interprets PA + B |

Axioms of ILM:

- L1 $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box B)$
- L2 $\Box(\Box A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow \Box A$
- J1 $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A \triangleright B$
- J2 $(A \triangleright B) \wedge (B \triangleright C) \rightarrow (A \triangleright C)$
- J3 $(A \triangleright C) \wedge (B \triangleright C) \rightarrow (A \vee B) \triangleright C$
- J4 $A \triangleright B \rightarrow (\Diamond A \rightarrow \Diamond B)$
- J5 $\Diamond A \triangleright A$
- M $A \triangleright B \rightarrow (A \wedge \Box C) \triangleright (B \wedge \Box C)$

Rules: modus ponens, necessitation for \Box

Theorem (Shavrukov, Berarducci):
 $\vdash_{\text{ILM}} A \Leftrightarrow \vdash_{\text{PA}} A^*$ for all translations A^* of A into the language \mathcal{L}_{PA} of arithmetic

A Nonstandard Provability Predicate

Let $\Delta A := \neg \nabla \neg A$. Then

$$\Delta A = \exists x (\Box_x A \wedge \neg \Box_{x-1} \perp)$$

where $\Box_{n+1}^{\Pi_1}$ ($\Box_0^{\Pi_1}$) stands for provability in IS_{n+1} ($\text{ID}_0 + \text{exp}$) with a Π_1 -oracle.

$\Rightarrow \Delta$ expresses a strong notion of provability, call it *s-provability*

The axioms and rules of provability logic (GL) are valid for s-provability in PA:

- 1. $\vdash_{\text{PA}} A \Rightarrow \vdash_{\text{PA}} \Delta A$
- 2. $\vdash_{\text{PA}} \Delta(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Delta A \rightarrow \Delta B)$
- 3. $\vdash_{\text{PA}} \Delta(\Delta A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow \Delta A$

A Bimodal Provability Logic

GLT, a first step towards adding Δ to ILM:

- T1 $\Delta(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Delta A \rightarrow \Delta B)$
- T2 $\Delta(\Delta A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow \Delta A$
- T3 $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box B)$
- T4 $\Delta A \rightarrow \Box A$
- T5 $\Box A \rightarrow \Delta \Box A$
- T6 $\Box A \rightarrow \Box \Delta A$
- T7 $\Box \Delta A \rightarrow \Box A$

Rules: modus ponens, and necessitation for Δ

Interpretation # 1

$\Box A$: A is provable in PA
 ΔA : A is s-provable

Interpretation # 2
Parikh's rule: from $\Box A$, infer A .

$\Box A$: A is provable in PA + Parikh's rule
 ΔA : A is provable in PA

Aim of Current Work

$\vdash_{\text{ILM}} "A \vee B$ is an infimum of A and B in the lattice of degrees."

On the other hand:

Fact: There exist A, B with $[A \wedge B] \neq \text{sup}([A], [B])$.

Fact: The existence of $\text{sup}([A], [B])$ is *not* expressible in \mathcal{L}_{ILM} .

\Rightarrow add to ILM a new modality whose arithmetical interpretation is the supremum

First Approach

Add to ILM a binary modality \oslash , together with the axiom

$$C \triangleright A \wedge C \triangleright B \Leftrightarrow C \triangleright A \oslash B.$$

Intended arithmetical meaning of $A \oslash B$: a sentence in $\text{sup}([A], [B])$.

An example (Švejdar): θ with

$$\vdash_{\text{PA}} \theta \Leftrightarrow \forall x (\Diamond_x \theta \rightarrow \Diamond_x A \wedge \Diamond_x B),$$

where \Box_0 stands for provability in $\text{ID}_0 + \text{exp}$, and \Box_{n+1} for provability in IS_{n+1} .

A Discovery

Shavrukov: there is a formula ∇ of \mathcal{L}_{PA} with one free variable, such that for all sentences A, B , and C of \mathcal{L}_{PA} ,


$$\vdash_{\text{PA}} C \triangleright A \wedge C \triangleright B \Leftrightarrow C \triangleright \nabla A \wedge \nabla B$$

\Rightarrow it suffices to add a *unary* modality ∇ to ILM

Standard Semantics

Model: $\langle W, Q, R, \Vdash \rangle$ with


- 1. R, Q conversely well-founded & transitive
- 2. $R \subseteq Q$
- 3. $Q \circ R \subseteq R, R \circ Q \subseteq R$
- 4. $R \subseteq R \circ Q$
- 5. Q, R accessibility relations for Δ, \Box



Lindström's Semantics

Model: $\langle W, Q, \Vdash \rangle$ with

- 1. Q conversely well-founded & transitive
- 2. Q accessibility relation for Δ
- 3. $w \Vdash \Box A \Leftrightarrow x \Vdash A$ whenever $|\{u \mid wQuQx\}| = \infty$



Soundness and Completeness

Theorem (Lindström):

- 1. GLT is arithmetically sound and complete with respect to Interpretation #2.
- 2. GLT is modally sound and complete with respect to Lindström's semantics.

Theorem :

GLT is modally sound and complete with respect to the standard semantics.

Future Work

- 1. Arithmetical completeness of GLT w.r.t. Interpretation #1
- 2. Adding Δ to ILM; arithmetical completeness (w.r.t. Int. #1) of the resulting system

References

Lindström, P.: On Parikh Provability - an Exercise in Modal Logic. Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg, Henrik Lagerlund and Sten Lindström and Rysiek Sliwinski (eds). Uppsala Philosophical Studies 53, pp.279–288, 2006.